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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
BANKRUPTCY: THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE
FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS ON THE
POLICY OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT.
In an effort to make our highways safer, states have been enacting
ever increasing amounts of legislation. One of the areas of prime con-
cern has been that of the financially irresponsible driver, who each year
is responsible for a large number of unpaid judgments, arising from
automobile accidents in which he was involved. In attempting to al-
leviate this problem, some states have tried compulsory liability insur-
ance legislation, which makes the proof of ability to respond in damages
to any automobile negligence claim a condition precedent to obtaining
a driver's license. This type of legislation has naturally been effective
in achieving the end sought, but has been highly criticized for its ad-
verse effect on insurance rates. Another type of legislation, and that
with which this article will be concerned, suspends an individual's driv-
ing privilege if he fails to satisfy a tort judgment based on his negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. Such legislation is generally embodied
under the heading of state financial responsibility laws. These laws do
not require proof of financial responsibility as a condition precedent to
the issuance of a driver's license, but do attempt to influence the finan-
cially irresponsible driver to exercise care on the highways through the
sanction of loss of driver's license. Under these laws, the state may take
away a judgment debtor's driver's license even though the debt has been
discharged through bankruptcy proceedings.1 The revocation having oc-
curred despite the bankruptcy discharge, the judgment debtor may have
his license reinstated only upon payment of the discharged debt and a
showing of future financial responsibility.
The problem presented by this type of legislation has been dealt
with by our courts on numerous occasions, judicial support being given
to the state's power in almost every instance. This does not mean that
the problem has been resolved, however, as is obvious from the number
of dissenting opinions that have accompanied these decisions and the
consistency of their objections to validity.2 The major question confront-
ing the courts in determining the validity of this legislation is whether
it conflicts with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act3 and is therefore
1 Bankruptcy Act §63(a) (7), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §103 (a) (7) (1958) :
"Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against his estate
which are founded upon . . .the right to recover damages in an action for
negligence instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy."
2 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962) ; Reitz v. Mealey,
314 U.S. 33 (1941) ; Reitz v. Mealey, 34 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. N.Y. 1940).
3 Bankruptcy Act §17,;30 Stat. 550 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §35 (1958):
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his
provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as (1) are
due as a tax levied by the U.S., or any State, county, district, or munici-
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invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kesler v. De-
partment of Public Safety, reaffirmed the majority view, upholding finan-
cial responsibility legislation as a proper exercise of the states' police
power, designed to promote public safety. The Court also found that no
"clear conflict" with the Bankruptcy Act existed.4 However, the Court
admitted that the statute did make some "inroad on the consequences
of the Bankruptcy Act.'' 5 What is of particular significance in the
Kesler case is the fact that the Utah statute, construed therein, included
in its provisions the right of the judgment creditor to control its oper-
ation.6 This case is the first judicial approval of a financial responsibility
statute designed to allow the judgment creditor to enforce its provisions.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LEGISLATION
The development of the financial responsibility statutes and their
judicial interpretation may be best illustrated in the State of New York
which produced the landmark Reitz case and other decisions construing
pality; (2) are liable for obtaining money or property by false pretenses
or false representations, or for willful and malicious injuries to the person
or property of another, or for alimony due or to become due, or for main-
tenance or support of wife or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female,
or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction of an un-
married female, or for criminal conversation; (3) have not been duly
scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name of the creditor,
if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowl-
edge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or (4) were created by his fraud,
embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation while acting as an officer or
in any fiduciary capacity; or (5) are for wages which have been earned
within three months before the date of commencement of the proceedings
in bankruptcy due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen,
on salary or commission basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling
exclusively for the bankrupt; or (6) are due for moneys of an employee
received or retained by his employer to secure the faithful performance of
such employee of the terms of the contract of employment."
4 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 172.
5 Id. at 171.
6 UTAH CoDE ANN. §41-12-13, 14, 17 (1953).
"13. Whenever any person fails within sixty days to satisfy any judgment,
upon the written request of the judgment creditor or his attorney it shall
be the duty of the clerk of the court, or of the judge of a court that has no
clerk, in which any such judgment is rendered within this state, to forward
to the commission immediately after the expiration of said sixty days, a
certified copy of such judgment.
"14. (a) The commission, upon the receipt of a certified copy of a judg-
ment, shall forthwith suspend the license and registration and any non-
resident's operating privilege of any person against whom such judgment
was rendered, . . . except as hereinafter otherwise provided in this section
and in section 41-12-17.
"(b) If the judgment creditor consents in writing, in such form as the
commission may prescribe, that the judgment debtor be allowed license and
registration or non-resident's operating privilege, the same may be allowed
by the commission in its discretion, for six months from the date of such
consent and thereafter until such consent is revoked in writing notwithstand-
ing default in the payment prescribed in section 41-12-17, provided the judg-
ment debtor furnishes proof of financial responsibility.
"17.... a discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of such judg-
ment shall not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of
this act."
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earlier forms of this statute.7 In 1933, New York's financial responsi-
bility statute was interpreted for the first time in the Perkins case. 8
It then provided for the mandatory and permanent suspension of the
license of any driver who failed to pay an automobile negligence judg-
ment, even if the same were discharged in bankruptcy.9 The statute was
held to be invalid as denying the bankrupt the full effect of his dis-
charge.'" The court found that the statute did not interfere with the
supremacy of the bankruptcy court in administering the property of the
bankrupt, but that it did deny to the bankrupt the benefit of his dis-
charge. In the same year, the court in Munz v. Harnett overruled the
Perkins case, adopting the position that the statute construed in the
Perkins case did not contravene the Bankruptcy Act. The court reasoned
that a discharge in bankruptcy was not regarded as a satisfaction of
a debt, and the exclusion, therefore, of a discharge as a satisfaction,
under the statute, did not conflict with the Bankruptcy Act."
In 1939, the stay of a suit based on the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle after the driver had been adjudged bankrupt was denied;
held, a stay after adjudication was in the discretion of the court, and
the suit was allowed to go to judgment in order to effectuate New York
policy as to its highways.
1 2
The first substantial change in the New York statute occurred in
1936, when the period of suspension was reduced to three years.1 3 The
financially irresponsible driver could have his license restored after this
time had elapsed if he could offer proof of financial responsibility in
the future, even though the judgment remained unpaid. The statute
was further amended in 1936, to provide that the judgment creditor
could consent to reinstatement of the judgment debtor's driving privi-
lege and could revoke his consent, causing revocation to occur again."
Then in 1939, language was added allowing the judgment creditor to
7 Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 2; In re Perkins, 3 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. N.Y. 1933) ;
Munz v. Harnett, 6 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. N.Y. 1933); In re Locker, 30 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D. N.Y. 1939).
s In re Perkins, supra note 7.
9 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 695, §94-b. "The operator's or chauffeur's license
and all of the registration certificates of any person, in the event of his
failure within fifteen days therefore to satisfy every judgment . . . rendered
against him . . . for damages on account of personal injury . . . resulting
from the ownership or operation of a motor vehicle by him . . . shall be
forthwith suspended . . . and shall remain so suspended . . . until saidjudgment or judgments are satisfied or discharged, except by a discharge in
bankruptcy ......
lo In re Perkins, supra note 7, at 697.
"1 Munz v. Harnett, supra note 7, at 160.
12 In re Locker, supra note 7.
13 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1936, ch. 448, §94-b: "... shall remain so suspended and
shall not be renewed . . . , until said judgment or judgments are satisfied
or discharged, . . . or three years shall have elapsed since such suspen-
sion ....
14Ibid., ". . . provided however, if the judgment creditor consents in writing
that the judgment debtor be allowed license and registration . . . and there-
after until such consent is revoked in writing...."
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institute the operation of the statute by a written notice to the clerk of
the court.'
The New York statute as it stood in 1939 was construed in the
famous Reitz case, wherein the court reiterated the majority's position,
holding that there was no violation of or conflict with the Bankruptcy
Act.'6 But the court did not consider the validity of the amendments
providing for creditor control. Although it did not pass upon the validity
of these amendments, the court was impressed with the argument that
the addition of the creditor control might deprive the debtor of the
immunity of his discharge and thereby bring that portion of the statute
into conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. After finding the amendments
separable from the original statute, the court further discounted any
conflict with the Bankruptcy Act stating:
The penalty . . is not for the protection of the creditor merely,
but to enforce a public policy that irresponsible drivers shall not
with impunity, be allowed to injure their fellows . . . it is an
enforcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety."'
The concern that was exhibited in the Reitz case over the amend-
ment allowing creditor control was passed over lightly in the Kesler
case. The position was taken that this amendment merely put into the
wording of the statute what was in fact necessary for its proper and
effective functioning, i.e., that the clerk of the court usually put the
statute into operation only upon the prodding of the judgment creditor.'9
Every state, as well as the District of Columbia, has some form of
financial reseponsibility statute. All of these statutes require the sus-
pension of driving privileges when the automobile judgment debtor has
not paid such judgment within a prescribed period.20 Twenty-one states
have statutes substantially similar to the one in Kesler, 2 which allow
a creditor to suspend, consent to restoration of, and subsequently revoke
the driving privileges of the judgment debtor.22 Fifteen other states
also allow the creditor to consent to restoration and revoke that consent,
but these laws are put into operation by the clerk of the court without
15 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1939, ch. 618 §94-b: ". . . It shall be the duty of the clerk
of the court ... to forward immediately, upon written demand of the judg-
ment creditor or his attorney . . . to such commissioner a certified copy of
such judgment...."
1' Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 2, at 38.
17 Ibid., ". . . and there is force in the argument that 94-B as amended, in
truth deprives the debtor of the immunity afforded by his discharge, leaves
out of view the public policy of the state or makes that public policy sub-
servient to the private interests of the creditor by affording him the op-
portunity to initiate, remove and revive the suspension of the license upon
terms as to payments on account of his claim."
1s Id. at 37.
'9 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 172.
20 Comment, 48 CORNELL L. Q. 316, 324 (1962-3).
21 Note 6 supra.
22Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 165 n. 29.
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initial direction by the judgment creditor.23 Forty-five states allow the
judgment debtor to reacquire his license upon a partial satisfaction of
the unpaid judgment and a showing of ability to respond financially in
the future.24 Thirty-six states allow restoration if the creditor requests
such, and the judgment debtor shows proof of future responsibility,
regardless of whether any payments have been made toward the judg-
ment.2 5 In all, forty-seven states specifically reject the discharge in bank-
ruptcy as a satisfaction of a judgment based on negligence.2 6
Wisconsin's financial responsibility statute, section 344.05 (1), pro-
vides that the clerk may initiate suspension with or without written
notification by a judgment creditor.2 7 The revocation is made pursuant
to section 344.25. 28 Subsection (2) of that section allows the judgment
debtor to retain or have reinstated his driving privileges upon written
consent by his creditor, if proof of future financial responsibility is fur-
nished and maintained. This subsection also provides that the afore-
mentioned actions are to be subject to the discretion of the commissioner
of motor vehicles.2 9 Under section 344.25 (3), if the judgment debtor
is able to obtain a court order for installment payments, and show proof
of future financial responsibility, the commissioner must allow him to
keep his license.30 A discharge in bankruptcy is specifically excepted as
23 Id. at 167 n. 31; See also Comment, supra note 20.
24 Comment, supra note 20.
25 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 165-8 n. 29-34.
26 Comment, supra note 20.
27 WiS. STAT. §344.05(1) (1961):
"Whenever any judgment in excess of $100 for damages arising out of a
motor vehicle accident is not satisfied within 30 days after its having become
final by expiration without which an appeal might have been perfected or by
final affirmation on appeal, the clerk of the court in which such judgment
was rendered, shall forthwith forward to the commissioner a certified copy
of such judgment."
28 WIs. STAT. §344.25 (1961):
"Upon the receipt, pursuant to section 344.05, of a certified copy of ajudgment for damages in excess of $100 arising out of a motor vehicle
accident, the commissioner shall forthwith revoke the operating privilege
and all registrations of the person against whom such judgment was rendered,
subject to the following exceptions .... .
29 WIs. STAT. §344.25(2) (1961) :
"If the judgment creditor consents in writing in such form as the commis-
sioner may prescribe that the judgment debtor be allowed to retain or re-
instate his operating privilege and registrations, the same may be allowed
by the commissioner, in his discretion, for 6 months from the date of such
consent and thereafter until such consent is revoked in writing, notwith-
standing default in the payment of such judgment or of any installments
thereof prescribed in section 344.27 provided the judgment debtor furnishes
proof of financial responsibility for the future and maintains such proof at
all times when such license and registrations are in effect during a period
of 3 years following the entry of the judgment."
3 0 Wis. STAT. §344.25(3) (1961) :
"The commissioner shall not revoke such license or registration if thejudgment debtor obtains a court order for installment payments and furnishes
proof of financial responsibility as provided in section 344.27."
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providing any relief from Wisconsin's financial responsibility laws by
section 344.26(2) 31
II. CONFLICT WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Underlying the Bankruptcy Act is the basic philosophy of giving an
oppressed debtor a new start toward becoming a useful, productive
citizen. In working to achieve this end the Bankruptcy Act is first con-
cerned with the distribution of the debtor's estate among his creditors
with provable claims. Once this is done the honest debtor is then allowed
to re-establish himself economically.32 The accomplishment of the basic
objective is then obtained through the discharge the bankrupt receives
in the bankruptcy proceedings. The discharge does not actually ex-
tinguish his debts, but prevents recovery by acting as a bar in legal
proceedings to recover on the debts.3 3 Thus in a practical sense the
discharge operates as a release of liability on the debt, but not in the
sense that the debtor is able to consider his debts paid.3 4 The discharge,
in effect, accelerates the statute of limitations.
It is on this theory that the courts have based their decision that
no conflict between financial responsibility legislation and the Bank-
ruptcy Act exists. This position was reiterated in Kesler:
A discharge does not free the bankrupt from all traces of the
debt.., a moral obligation to pay the debt survives the discharge
and is sufficient to permit a state to grant recovery to the creditor
on the basis of a promise subsequent to discharge, even though
the promise is not supported by a new consideration.3 5
The distinction between a discharge and payment or satisfaction may
eliminate conflict in the technical sense, but the conflict still remains no
less real when viewed in light of the end sought to be achieved by the
bankruptcy discharge. The judgment debtor is not freed from the dis-
chargeable debt. The affirmative defense supplied him by his discharge
is of little use. If he attempts to assert it he must forsake his driving
privilege. Under the Bankruptcy Act the bankrupt may waive his dis-
charge, but under financial responsibility laws he loses it through no
action of his own.3 6 The debtor is forced to forego the benefit of his
discharge if he wishes to save his driving privilege. Conflict exists then
in undermining the effect sought to be accomplished by affording a dis-
charge to the debtor.
31 Wis. STAT. §344.26(2) (1961):
"A discharge in bankruptcy following the rendering of any such judgment
does not relieve the judgment debtor from any of the requirements of this
section."
32 1 COLLIER, BANimuIpCY 517.27 (14th ed. 1956).
33 d. at 514.02.
34 Zavelo v. Reeves, 227 U.S. 625 (1913). "The discharge destroys the remedy,
but not the indebtedness"; See also, Spalding v. New York, 16 U.S. (4
How.) 12 (1846).
35 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 170.
36 CoLLiER, op. cit. supra note 33.
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Aside from a conflict with the effect of the discharge, another pos-
sible conflict may be shown. Due to the fact that it is also the purpose
of the Bankruptcy Act to distribute the debtor's non-exempt property
among his creditors, any procedure that would give a particular creditor
a preferred status would be in conflict with this first objective of bank-
ruptcy. The possibility of the financial responsibility laws giving such
a preferred status to tort judgment creditors was pointed out by Justice
Black in his dissenting opinion in the Kesler case:
It means that a . . . automobile-accident judgment creditor will
be given a decided advantage over all other creditors suffering
loss from the bankruptcy ... only he can prove his claim, share
in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate and still, at the same
time retain the power to force the bankrupt to pay the rest of
the claim.37
Although the financial responsibility laws do not explicitly grant an
additional legal remedy to judgment creditors, they do supply a device
that survives the discharge in bankruptcy which is tantamount to such
a grant. The purpose of these laws may be to promote highway safety,
but they also impose a condition requiring the relinquishment of a
right created by Congress. Such state laws will be invalid when they
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment or execution of the purposes
of such laws as Congress may enact.38
It is also of note that in many of the cases that have arisen under
the various financial responsibility laws the debtor-motorist involved
has been one whose very livelihood depended upon his driving privi-
leges.39 It is in this type of situation that the practical pressure of these
laws becomes obvious. The debtor's license and in effect his livelihood
is pledged as security for the payment of his debt, and he is thereby
forced to bargain with his creditor, by making some sort of arrange-
ment to pay the debt in order to retain his license. Although assign-
ment of wages or future earning power have been held not to survive
a bankruptcy proceeding, 40 here is in effect a pledge of future earning
power. In answer to this argument, it has been advanced that the bank-
rupt need not continue to pursue this source for his livelihood in that
all other fields of economic endeavor are open to him with complete
freedom.41 Thus the debtor is allowed to start anew, but with one quali-
fication, he must start out in a completely new field of endeavor. Under
37Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 183.
38 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) ; Cloverleaf Butter Co.
v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) ;
Ex parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 217, 194 P. 2d 800 (1948). See also, 81
C.J.S. States §7, at 874, 887 (1953).
o Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2; Reitz v. Mealey, supra
note 2; Munz v. Harnett, supra note 7.
40 Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
41 Note, 43 YALE L. J. 344 (1933-4) ; 47 HARV. L. REv. 870 (1933-4).
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this reasoning it seems obvious that the statute imposes a penalty on
the debtor for having resorted to bankruptcy. 42
The addition of the provision allowing the creditor to control the
functioning of the statute makes the law's practical pressure even more
apparent. This was brought out by Justice Cooper in his dissenting opin-
ion in Reitz v. Mealey where he stated: "This section makes the com-
missioner of motor vehicles a disguised collection agent for the judg-
ment creditor."43 The advantage to the creditor is said to be merely
incidental to the purpose of protecting the public against financially
irresponsible drivers, but allowing the creditor to control the statute's
operation, thereby giving him this collection advantage, seems more than
incidental.
A Maryland court interpreting its financial responsibility law, which
did not specifically exclude a discharge in bankruptcy, held that a
bankruptcy discharge did amount to a satisfaction under their statute.4 4
The court felt that the interpretation must be such that no conflict with
the Bankruptcy Act would result. In stating that "these provisions dem-
onstrate that it was not the intention of the legislature to apply the law
to judgment debtors who have been discharged in bankruptcy," the
court recognized that an obvious and irreconcilable conflict would arise
if the bankruptcy discharge was excluded.45 Based on this reasoning the
mere exception of a discharge by the statute would result in conflict.
III. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
In situations of grave national concern, individual states, with cer-
tain qualifications, may exercise their police power to alleviate the prob-
lem in their respective localities. Here, the states' concern being the
safety of their highways, any legislation designed to promote such safety
has been held to be a valid exercise of police power, unless a "clear
collision" with that national law can be shown.46 The portion of the
New York statute interpreted in the Reitz case seems to be such a valid
exercise of police power. In this case a state official, applying the statute,
suspended the license of all the drivers who had not satisfied a tort
judgment. The statute also required of such a driver that he show proof
of future responsibility. Therefore, the statute was "reasonably designed
to induce careful driving and to assure compensation in case of lia-
bility."47 For any such statute to be a valid exercise, these reasons must
be primary and not incidental to its operation.
The addition of the right of the creditor to control the operation of
this type of statute has a distinct effect upon its purpose. Under a
4230 GEo. L. J. 568 (1941-2).
43 Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 2, at 537.
44Ellis v. Rudy, 171 Md. 280, 189 Atl. 281 (1937); See also, Comment, 5 U.
PITT. L. REv. 26 (1939).
45 Ellis v. Rudy, supra note 44, at 282.
46 Kesler v. Department of Public Safety, supra note 2, at 172.
47 8 U. CHaI. L. RFv. 326, 327 (1940).
1963-1964]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
statute with such cgntrol added, as illustrated by the statute in Kesler,
the state official must do as the creditor directs. The commissioner is
left with no initial discretion at all. Thus, a judgment creditor upon
making some arrangement with the debtor, may totally prevent the
statute's operation. In this situation it is difficult to see where the public
good is being served. All that is being served is the creditor's private
financial interests; such an effect would seem to indicate that the state
is not interested in keeping financially irresponsible drivers off the
road.
48
One of the basic weaknesses of this legislation, in the first instance,
is that it becomes operative only after a financially irresponsible driver
has had an accident. After his first accident, the driver is then required
to show proof that he will be able to respond to any damage claim.
Under statutes that allow a creditor to control their operation, the law
may never be imposed against a financially irresponsible driver if he
makes a proper arrangement with his creditor. Such legislation can
hardly be said to secure financial responsibility among motorists, for
it is applied only against some at the whim of the creditor.
Another question surrounding the creditor control type of statute
is the validity of delegating the enforcement of police power. Under this
form of statute, the enforcement of the exercise of state police power
is delegated to a single, unknown and undetermined individual. Dis-
cussing this characteristic, Justice Cooper in Reitz v. Mealey stated:
"It is held in substance that the police power can neither be abdicated
nor bargained away and is inalienable even by express grant. '49 This
consideration, along with the realization that the individual delegatee
acts only for his own purpose rather than for the public good, seems to
put the creditor control provision beyond the borders of the valid
exercise of police power.
Colorado, in deciding that its statute was unconstitutional, held that
the public received no protection whatsoever and that the statute was
designed merely to secure the payment of a private obligation. It was
pointed out that this form of legislation did not have the effect of re-
quiring a continued showing of financial responsibility of all drivers on
the road. If all drivers were required to show financial responsibility
before being allowed to drive, then this would have a real bearing upon
the public safety.
50
The argument that police power should not be struck down unless
a "clear conflict exists" becomes of less force if the exercise of that
police power can be successfully attacked. If the public safety becomes
incidental and an assistance to creditors as a collection device becomes
48 111 U. PA. L. REv. 113 (1962).
49 Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 2, at 538.
so People v. Nothaus, 147 Col. 210, 363 P. 2d 180 (1961).
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paramount in its operation, then a creditor control statute would not
be a valid exercise of police power and would not be entitled to the
benefit of a "clear conflict" rule.
The inroads made upon the Bankruptcy Act through the police power
of the states in the name of financial responsibility laws are based on
the theory that the operation of an automobile on the states' highways
is a privilege. A state appends conditions to the retention of the privi-
lege and may suspend the privilege for violation of them.51 This concept
gives rise to the question, "In what other areas of privilege may it be-
possible for the state through its police power to legislate against the
effects of bankruptcy ?" In 1905, a New York court ruled that a fireman
could not be dismissed from his job for having resorted to bankruptcy
proceedings.5 2 Such action by the state was held to amount to penalizing
a person for using bankruptcy. The Reitz case criticized this holding,
stating that ability to pay debts was a proper criteria for determining
admissibility to hold certain jobs.5 3
The concept of privilege giving rise to the right of the states to con-
dition its retention is a broad basis for thwarting bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The reasoning of the Kesler case would allow a state to use this right
to condition privileges in such a manner as to exclude recourse to bank-
ruptcy as long as some public policy reason could be shown why a par-
ticular debt should be paid. This reasoning may be extended to all areas
of privilege that come into contact with public interests. If so, then, the
licensing of automobile drivers is only the first area of privilege under
which the Bankruptcy Act will be successfully legislated against.
IV. CONCLUSION
The questions the court was faced with in the Reitz and Kesler cases
are often raised in regard to financial responsibility legislation. By
reason of the widespread adoption of these laws and hteir reasonably
uniform character, the conclusion can be drawn that inceptually, at
least, such laws have been advanced to further the policy of controlling
a problem of nationwide concern, i.e., highway safety. It is conceded
that such legislation should be given judicial interpretation as will best
augment the desired effect, even to the degree that, unless it trans-
gressed upon grounds specifically reserved to the federal government,
it will be protected. But a statute like the one involved in the Kesler
case, 5 which on its face is designed to promote the public welfare, and
in operation and effect is primarily a device to secure payment of dis-
charged debts, must be held to be in such conflict with federal bank-
ruptcy laws as to necessitate its invalidation.
51 Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W. 2d 52 (1951); DeVries v. Sec. of
State, 329 Mich. 64, 44 N.W. 2d 82 (1950); Smith v. Hayes, 60 Ohio Op.
112, 133 N.E. 2d 443 (1955).
52 In re Hicks, 133 F. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1905).
53 Reitz v. Mealey, supra note 2, at 535.
54 Note 6 supra.
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It is urged that the automobile accident judgment creditor deserves
a strong social policy in his favor because his association with his debtor
is involuntary, rather than voluntary in nature, as are most debtor-
creditor relationships in bankruptcy. 55 But the Bankruptcy Act does
not provide for such a preferred status, and none should be read into
it, so as to eliminate the plain conflict that exists between the Act and
these state laws.
It has been argued that the conflict alluded to should be resolved in
a practical manner in accord with judicial accommodation.56 The resolu-
tion of such conflicts is generally made so that the proper exercise of
neither the state nor the federal law is impaired. Such a result would
certainly be desirous here. But, in order to reach a solution of this nature
it would be necessary to close the eyes of the judiciary to a conflict
that is direct and positive. The Bankruptcy Act frees the automobile
judgment debtor of the consequences of his debt, while the state statute
provides a method by which the creditor may still force payment. In
such instance either a state statute or the Bankruptcy Act will have to
be inoperative. A more acceptable solution in light of the obvious con-
flict and the importance of protecting our highways might be to provide
specifically for such an exception in the Bankruptcy Act.57 The justi-
fications offered by court decisions on the financial responsibility laws
merely create a further problem in that they have established a basis
upon which more (and even less acceptable) inroads on bankruptcy
may be made.
JOHN L. REITER
5 48 CONELL L. Q. 316, 324 (1962-3).
56Id. at 325; Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1944) ; See also Note, supra note
41, at 346.
57U. ILL L. F. 467, 469 (1962).
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